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The concept of privacy developed alongside the common law, but it also has a philosophical background.  It is 
especially important for librarians, archivists, 
publishers, and book distributors to understand 
the concept of privacy, since behind all the 
philosophical debates is the fact that privacy is 
about the dissemination of information.  And, 
of course, that is the business we are all in.  As 
one author explained:
Privacy [law] attempts to draw a line 
between the individual and the collec-
tive, between self and society.  It seeks 
to assure the individual a zone in which 
to be an individual, not a member of the 
community.  In that zone he can think his 
own thoughts, have his own secrets, live 
his own life, reveal only what he wants 
to the outside world.1
In the U.S. Constitution, privacy comes 
first from the fourth and fifth Amendments, 
later applied to the states by the fourteenth 
Amendment.  In the 20th century, the U.S. 
Supreme Court decided a number of First 
Amendment cases on the basis of privacy. 
In the 19th century, however, the concept of 
privacy was the purview of philosophers rather 
than lawyers.2  The concept traces its roots back 
to Aristotle’s “distinction between the public 
sphere of political activity and the private 
sphere associated with family and domestic 
life.”3  As John Stuart Mill asked his readers 
in the classic treatise On Liberty:
WHAT, then, is the rightful 
limit to the sovereignty of 
the individual over himself? 
Where does the authority of 
society begin?  How much of 
human life should be assigned 
to individuality, and how much 
to society?  Each will receive 
its proper share, if each has 
that which more particularly 
concerns it.  To individuality 
should belong the part of life 
in which it is chiefly the in-
dividual that is interested; 
to society, the part which 
chiefly interests society.4
The idea of privacy as a function of liberty 
was an attempt to differentiate the home from 
the society.  As author Randall P. Bezanson 
has noted:
The right to privacy thus represented 
an effort to preserve communitarian 
values and institutions.  The right “to 
be let alone” connoted protection of 
the community from the masses, the 
maintenance of a local reference point 
for personal identity.  It did not, as it 
does today, convey an idea of extreme 
individualism, of freedom “to” rather 
than freedom “from.”  It was not a pro-
tection against public embarrassment.  
It was not even, at the time, a concept 
principally designed to instill norms 
of decency in the public press or the 
public dialogue; that purpose arose later.  
Rather, privacy reflected the fact that 
personal identity developed in discrete 
institutions such as the extended family 
and the circle of friends and associates 
that are perhaps best captured in the 
term “local community.”  The concept 
of privacy represented an attempt to 
protect the functioning of those discrete 
social institutions from the monolithic, 
impersonal, and value-free forces of 
modern society by channeling [sic] 
that which is personal to these discrete 
institutions and foreclosing it to society 
at large.5
It took the future Supreme Court Jus-
tice Louis D. Brandeis and his partner, 
Samuel Warren, to define the legal 
right to privacy in 
a famous article in 
the Harvard Law 
Review.6  Warren 
and Brandeis were 
concerned with the free 
flow of information, and 
felt that technological develop-
ments had made family life public. 
They were especially upset over in-
formation and illustrations printed in 
the newspaper about the wedding of 
Warren’s daughter.  The two lawyers 
struggled to find a way to legally protect this 
realm of privacy.  According to the article:
That the individual shall have full 
protection in person and in property is 
a principle as old as the common law; 
but it has been found necessary from 
time to time to define anew the exact 
nature and extent of such protection.  
Political, social, and economic changes 
entail the recognition of new rights, and 
the common law, in its eternal youth, 
grows to meet the demands of society. 
. . . Gradually, the scope of these legal 
rights broadened, and now the right to 
life has come to mean the right to en-
joy life — the right to be let alone; the 
right to liberty secures the exercise of 
extensive civil privileges; and the term 
“property” has grown to compromise 
every form of possession — intangible 
as well as tangible. . . .
Recent inventions and business meth-
ods call attention to . . . the right “to be 
let alone.”  Instantaneous photographs 
and newspaper enterprise have invaded 
the sacred precincts of private and 
domestic life, and numerous mechani-
cal devices threaten to make good the 
prediction that “what is whispered in 
the closet shall be proclaimed from the 
housetops.”7
The Warren and Brandeis article was the 
first attempt to define a legal privacy right.  In 
seeking to define a law of privacy, Warren 
and Brandeis looked at the law of defama-
tion.  The issue of privacy is very similar to 
defamation, since privacy seeks to restrict the 
flow of information while defamation seeks 
to punish false information.  However, there 
are also important differences.  While defama-
tion is concerned with damage to reputations, 
false light invasion of privacy deals with the 
plaintiff’s mental distress.8  Courts have de-
cided that “false light invasion of privacy” is 
often also defamation.  In many cases, the two 
theories are included as alternatives;  however, 
the plaintiff can only recover on one ground 
for a single publication.9
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Comparisons Between Privacy  
and Defamation
When the privacy article was written in 
1890, Brandeis was already showing flashes of 
the genius that would make him the first Jewish 
member of the U.S. Supreme Court.  (Samuel 
Warren was no slouch, either.)  The two au-
thors didn’t just advocate a right of privacy; 
they actually tried to define its structure and 
borders.  The law partners articulated a series 
of principles from defamation law that could 
be applied to their proposed right of privacy. 
The rules that Warren and Brandeis described 
are as follows:
(1)  The right to privacy does not pro-
hibit any publication of matter which is 
of public or general interest. 
This is both an acknowledgement of the 
First Amendment and an attempt to create a 
workable rule.  An analogy from defamation 
law would be the case of New	York	Times	v.	
Sullivan.10  In that case, Sullivan was the po-
lice commissioner of Montgomery, Alabama. 
Sullivan was newsworthy because he was 
a public figure.  Thus, the Supreme Court 
ruled that stories about Sullivan and the way 
in which he runs the police department are of 
general interest.  As Warren and Brandeis 
state:
The design of the law must be to protect 
those persons with those affairs the com-
munity has no legitimate concern, from 
being dragged into an undesirable and 
undesired publicity and to protect all 
persons . . . from having matters which 
they may properly prefer to keep private, 
made public against their will.  It is the 
unwarranted invasion of individual 
privacy which is reprehended, and to 
be, so far as possible, prevented.  The 
distinction, however, noted in the above 
statement is obvious and fundamental.  
There are persons who may reasonably 
claim as a right, protection from the 
notoriety entailed by being made the 
victims of journalistic enterprise.  There 
are others who, in varying degrees, 
have renounced the right to live their 
lives screened from public observation.  
Matters which men of the first class 
may justly contend, concern themselves 
alone, may in those of the second be the 
subject of legitimate interest to their 
fellow citizens.  Peculiarities of man-
ner and person, which in the ordinary 
individual should be free from com-
ment, may acquire a public importance, 
if found in a candidate for political 
office.  Some further discrimination is 
necessary, therefore, than to class facts 
or deeds as public or private. . . .  To 
publish of a modest and retiring indi-
vidual that he suffers from an impedi-
ment in his speech or that he cannot spell 
correctly is an unwarranted, if not an 
unexampled, infringement of his rights, 
while to state and comment on the same 
characteristics found in a would-be 
congressman could not be regarded as 
beyond the pale of propriety.11
(2)  The right to privacy does not pro-
hibit the communication of any matter, 
though in its nature private, when the 
publication is made under circumstanc-
es which would render it a privileged 
communication according to the law of 
slander and libel.
This exception concerns statements made 
in court, during the deliberation of a legislative 
body, and similar types of situations.12  There 
are times when a private matter is brought up in 
a courtroom.  Once that occurs, the matter is no 
longer private, and becomes a matter of public 
record.  For example, allegations of adultery by 
a person who is not a public figure shouldn’t be 
put on the front page of the newspaper under 
normal circumstances.  However, they may be 
revealed during divorce proceedings.
(3)  The law would probably not grant 
any redress for the invasion of privacy 
by oral publication in the absence of 
special damage.
In this situation, Warren and Brandeis are 
talking about the 19th Century belief that the 
words in print would last longer and be dis-
seminated more widely than the spoken word. 
With the technological advances in radio and 
television, spoken words can be disseminated 
as widely as print, and can last just as long. 
This principle may not have stood the test of 
time.  Warren and Brandeis were also think-
ing about political speech issues, stating:  “The 
injury resulting from such oral communica-
tions would ordinarily be so trifling that the 
law might well, in the interest of free speech, 
disregard it altogether.”
(4)  The right to privacy ceases upon 
the publication of the facts by the indi-
vidual, or with his consent.
This principle is based on a type of implied 
consent.  Naturally, if someone puts informa-
tion into the public sphere, he or she can’t later 
claim invasion of privacy (or defamation, for 
that matter).  Of course, if the information is 
released for a restricted purpose, this does not 
constitute a disclosure. 
For example, medical records can’t be dis-
closed without permission.  A physician can’t 
tell a newspaper reporter that Joe Smith has 
cancer.  However, if Joe Smith writes an article 
talking about having cancer, the newspaper can 
report this later.  After all, Joe Smith already 
put the information into the public sphere.  On 
the other hand, just because Joe Smith tells his 
family that he has cancer doesn’t mean that it 
has become public knowledge, so the paper 
can’t report on this illness.  “[T]he important 
principle in this connection [is] that a private 
communication of circulation for a restricted 
purpose is not a publication with the meaning 
of the law.”13
(5)  The truth of the matter published 
does not afford a defense. 
Warren and Brandeis stress that truth 
should not be a defense, since:  “It is not for in-
jury to the individual’s character that redress or 
prevention is sought, but for injury to the right 
of privacy.  For the former, the law of slander 
and libel provides perhaps a sufficient safe-
guard.  The latter implies the right not merely 
to prevent inaccurate portrayal of private life, 
but to prevent its being depicted at all.”14
(6)  The absence of “malice” in the 
publisher does not afford a defense.
According to Warren and Brandeis, it 
shouldn’t matter whether the disclosure of 
information was made with malice or whether 
it was made in innocence.  It is the disclosure of 
information itself that they are concerned with, 
not the reason for the disclosure.  This principle 
is borrowed from defamation law as well, since 
proof of actual malice is only necessary if the 
subject is a public figure.  “The invasion of 
the privacy that is to be protected is equally 
complete and equally injurious, whether the 
motive by which the speaker or writer was 
actuated are, taken by themselves, culpable 
or not; just as the damage to character, and, to 
some extent, the tendency to provoke a breach 
of the peace, is equally the result of defama-
tion without regard to the motives leading to 
its publication.”15
It is amazing how much of the law of pri-
vacy comes from this article by Warren and 
Brandeis.  Although somewhat dated (the 
belief that oral communications didn’t matter 
has been surpassed by technology), most of the 
principles articulated by these two authors are 
still a part of the law of privacy.  The article 
recommended that the remedies for invasion 
of privacy be an action for damages or an 
injunction.16  These are still the remedies that 
are used.  Warren and Brandeis set the frame-
work for our right of privacy, and we are still 
following this framework more than a century 
later.  Everything that came later was simply a 
refinement.  Yet there have been a few changes 
in our conception of privacy law.  As Randall 
P. Bezanson has noted:
[P]rivacy in 1890 was focused princi-
pally on apprehension about disclosure 
of personal affairs in the public forum, 
particularly in the relatively new mass 
media.  In 1890, information was tightly 
and almost exclusively controlled by a 
very few large institutions.  As the domi-
nant institution, the press was viewed 
with apprehension by the individual.  It 
threatened loss of identity or, perhaps 
more accurately, it threatened to shift 
the source of identity by making iden-
tity into a social construct rather than a 
choice governed by oneself and one’s 
intimate associations.  In the 1990s, 
control of information — both access 
to it and the power of its dissemination 
— is much more widely dispersed.  In-
formation generally still is the province 
of institutions, but many more institu-
tions possess personal information, and 
the prospect of even more decentralized 
control over information looms large.  
There is little likelihood that the mecha-
nisms that earlier served as gatekeepers 
on information are an effective limit on 
disclosure today.  The comfort, if that is 
an apt description, of a large but limited 
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threat has been removed.  Indeed, part 
of the concern about privacy today is 
the seemingly unlimited potential for 
disclosure from multiple sources for 
multiple, and unknown, uses.  Disclo-
sure of information in the public press 
seems hardly the bulk of the privacy 
problem today, although it is surely the 
most widely noted.17
The 20th Century court cases involving pri-
vacy have tended towards a finding of privacy 
as a First Amendment right to receive informa-
tion, including (with great controversy) the 
case of Griswold	v.	Connecticut.18  This record 
was reviewed by the Hawaii Attorney General 
in a discussion of library privacy:19
The First Amendment “necessarily pro-
tects the right to receive” information.  
It protects the anonymity of the author;  
the anonymity of members of organiza-
tions;  the right to ask persons to join a 
labor organization without registering 
to do so;  the right to dispense and to 
receive birth control information in pri-
vate;  the right to have controversial mail 
delivered without written request;  the 
right to go to a meeting without being 
questioned as to whether you attended 
or what you said;  the right to give a 
lecture without being compelled to tell 
the government what you said;  and the 
right to view a pornographic film in 
the privacy of your own home without 
governmental intrusion. 
If by virtue of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendment, “a state has no business telling a 
man, sitting alone in his own house, what books 
he may read or what films he may watch,” then 
neither does the state have any business telling 
a man’s neighbor what book or picture he has 
checked out of the public library to read or view 
in the privacy of his own home.20 
On the other hand, the First Amendment 
also provides a counter-balance to the idea of 
privacy in certain situations.  For example, the 
“public figure” test in the case of New	York	
Times	v.	Sullivan21 points in the other direction. 
Also, the guarantee of freedom of the press can 
be in conflict with privacy. These factors make 
privacy cases very difficult to decide.  “While 
almost everyone favors privacy in the abstract, 
conflict always arises over the particulars.  Like 
obscenity, most people agree there is a line 
beyond which conduct is unacceptable:  but 
where is it?  Who is to draw the line?  How 
will it be drawn?  Specificity is particularly 
important in understanding whether informa-
tional privacy is something that we have and 
must protect or is something to be gained.”22 
As Michael Grossberg has observed, “[I]t 
is impossible to escape these definitional is-
sues. . . . Privacy is in many ways a matter 
of shared expectations and sensibilities; thus, 
controversy over its meaning has always been 
linked to clashing normative concerns about 
the flow of information and the social occasion, 




The biggest problem with defining the 
limits of privacy comes in the idea that a 
democracy works best when information is 
made known to the people.  For example, 
privacy concerns are a powerful reason for 
the denial of a FOIA request or for redaction 
of names and addresses.  We also want our 
medical records available for emergencies, 
but protected the rest of the time.  Security is 
another area where the dichotomy between 
the private and the public sphere has broken 
down.24  Yet for all its difficulties, privacy has 
become a piece of our liberty, and the right of 
privacy is here to stay.
The work of Samuel Warren and Louis 
Brandeis made history when it was pub-
lished.  A whole body of law sprang up 
overnight, with most of its principles already 
established.  While we have made refine-
ments to the law of privacy in the past 128 
years, most of what we know today as the 
law of privacy came from the pen of these 
two great legal minds.  It is only fitting that 
we pay tribute to the unexpectedly large in-
fluence that one article by two law partners 
has had on our lives.  
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